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Micron Technology, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
SAN JOSE DIVISION

INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES NORTH  
AMERICA CORP.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MOSAID TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 5:02-CV-05772 JF (RS)

**MICRON'S RESPONSE TO THE  
STIPULATED MOTION FOR  
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE,  
AND OBJECTION TO PROPOSED  
ORDER**

The Honorable Jeremy Fogel

1 *Amicus curiae* Micron Technology, Inc. (“Micron”) hereby responds to the Stipulated  
 2 Motion for Dismissal with Prejudice filed by the parties on March 2, 2007, and objects to the  
 3 accompanying Proposed Order, which purports to dismiss claims that have already been finally  
 4 adjudicated. Dismissal of such claims not only is impossible, but would be factually erroneous  
 5 and inconsistent with a prior judgment and order entered by the Court. To avoid error and  
 6 ambiguity, Micron proposes revising the dismissal order in the manner set forth below.

## 7 **I. BACKGROUND**

8 The recitation of the procedural history set forth in the Court’s February 7, 2007 Order  
 9 provides the relevant context for Micron’s response and objection:

10 [MOSAID Technologies, Inc. (“Mosaid”)] is in the business of  
 11 acquiring patents in order to obtain revenue by licensing such  
 12 patents or litigating alleged infringement of such patents. Mosaid  
 13 owns several patents in the area of dynamic random access memory  
 14 (“DRAM”). The four largest manufacturers of DRAM products are  
 15 Samsung Electronics Company, Ltd. (“Samsung”), Hynix  
 Semiconductor, Inc. (“Hynix”), [Infineon Technologies North  
 America Corporation (“Infineon”)] and Micron, accounting for  
 more than 75% of worldwide DRAM sales. [ProMOS  
 Technologies Inc. (“ProMOS”)] is a smaller DRAM manufacturer.

16 Mosaid filed a patent infringement suit against Samsung in the  
 17 District of New Jersey in September 2001. Infineon thereafter filed  
 18 a declaratory judgment action against Mosaid in this Court in  
 19 December 2002, seeking declarations that the same DRAM patents  
 20 asserted against Samsung were invalid, unenforceable and/or not  
 21 infringed by Infineon. Mosaid counterclaimed against Infineon,  
 22 alleging infringement of the subject patents. The Judicial Panel on  
 Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the *Samsung* and *Infineon*  
 cases in the District of New Jersey for pretrial proceedings,  
 including claim construction. District Judge Martini issued a claim  
 construction order construing thirty disputed claim terms, along  
 with a sixty-nine page opinion explaining the bases for his rulings.  
 The claim construction opinion is unfavorable to Mosaid in at least  
 some respects.

23 On January 18, 2005, MOSAID announced that it had settled  
 24 with Samsung. On the same date, Mosaid filed suit against Hynix in  
 the Eastern District of Texas. Shortly thereafter, Hynix settled and  
 25 took a license from MOSAID.

26 The *Infineon* action continued, and on April 1, 2005, Judge  
 27 Martini granted Infineon’s motion for summary judgment of non-  
 infringement as to several of the patents in suit in a published, fifty-  
 28 nine page opinion. Five days later, Mosaid filed a second patent  
 infringement action against Infineon in the Eastern District of  
 Texas, alleging infringement of other patents. The MDL panel

1 subsequently transferred the first *Infineon* action back to this Court.  
2 In October 2005, this Court approved a stipulation certifying Judge  
3 Martini's non-infringement order as a final judgment pursuant to  
4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), thus permitting Mosaid to  
5 file an immediate appeal of Judge Martini's order, and stayed the  
6 remainder of the case.

7 At a June 9, 2006 status conference, Mosaid advised this Court  
8 that the *Infineon* case was settling and that the parties would be  
9 making a joint request to vacate all of Judge Martini's rulings as  
10 part of that settlement. Based upon the parties' representation that  
11 there were no collateral proceedings that would be affected by the  
12 requested vacatur, this Court asked the parties to submit a proposed  
13 order vacating Judge Martini's rulings. At that point, Mosaid's  
14 appeal was still pending in the Federal Circuit; the parties jointly  
15 sought and obtained remand to this Court.

16 On July 24, 2006, Mosaid and Infineon filed a joint motion to  
17 vacate Judge Martini's rulings. On the same date, Micron filed a  
18 declaratory judgment action against Mosaid in this Court, Case No.  
19 C 06-4496 JF (RS), and moved to intervene or in the alternative to  
20 appear as *amicus curiae* in the *Infineon* action in order to oppose  
21 the motion to vacate. The following day, on July 25, 2006, Mosaid  
22 filed a patent infringement suit against Micron in the Eastern  
23 District of Texas. Mosaid also named as defendants two relatively  
24 small DRAM manufacturers, ProMOS and Power[c]hip  
25 Semiconductor Corporation ("Power[c]hip").

26 On September 8, 2006, ProMOS filed a motion for leave to  
27 intervene or in the alternative to appear as *amicus curiae* in the  
28 *Infineon* action in order to oppose the parties' joint motion to  
vacate, and on September 20, 2006, ProMOS filed a declaratory  
relief action against Mosaid in this Court, Case No. C 06-5788 JF  
(RS).

This Court subsequently dismissed Micron's declaratory relief  
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ProMOS voluntarily  
dismissed its declaratory relief action without prejudice. On  
October 23, 2006, the Court denied the motions of Micron and  
ProMOS to intervene in this action, but granted them leave to  
appear as *amici curiae*. The Court also requested supplemental  
briefing on the joint motion to vacate after concluding that the  
potential collateral estoppel effect of Judge Martini's rulings must  
be considered in determining the equities of vacatur.

Feb. 7, 2007, Order at 2-3.

On February 7, 2007, the Court entered an order denying Infineon's and MOSAID's joint  
motion to vacate, finding that "some or all of Judge Martini's rulings may be entitled to  
preclusive effect. Under these circumstances, the equities weigh against vacatur." *Id.* at 5.

On March 2, 2007, MOSAID and Infineon filed a “Stipulated Motion for Dismissal with Prejudice,” and an accompanying proposed order that tracks the stipulation.

## **II. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ENTER THE PROPOSED ORDER IN ITS CURRENT FORM**

The stipulated motion and proposed order submitted by Infineon and MOSAID purport to dismiss “all” claims presented by the complaint, and “all” counterclaims. This form of order is improper because it is inconsistent with the facts.

Final judgment has already been entered as to a number of the claims and counterclaims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).<sup>1</sup> Those claims cannot be dismissed, because judgment has already previously been entered on them. *See generally E.E.O.C. v. Peabody Western Coal Co.*, 400 F.3d 774, 785 (9th Cir. 2005) (observing that entry of final judgment effectively dismisses a claim). The order of dismissal can only properly dismiss the balance of the claims and counterclaims, which were not subject to the Rule 54(b) judgment.

By purporting to dismiss “all” claims and counterclaims presented by the pleadings, the proposed order erroneously purports to dismiss counterclaims that were subject to the Rule 54(b) judgment. It is not possible for the Court to dismiss the claims and counterclaims covered by the Rule 54(b) judgment because those claims and counterclaims have already been finally adjudicated; there is nothing to dismiss.

## **III. MICRON’S PROPOSED REVISION**

The problem discussed above can be avoided if the Court simply adds the word “remaining” before the words “claims” and “counterclaims” in the proposed order of dismissal, so that the proposed order would read:

**“All remaining claims presented by the complaint and all the remaining counterclaims in this action shall be dismissed with prejudice . . . .”**

<sup>1</sup> Specifically, final judgment was entered as to Counterclaim Counts II, III, IV, V, VI, and X. [See Docket No. 98.] The Rule 54(b) judgment did not dispose of the balance of the lawsuit. All proceedings as to the remaining claims were stayed pending final disposition of any appeal regarding the claims as to which judgment was entered. [See Docket No. 92.]

1 This change would acknowledge the fact that final judgment has already been entered as to some  
 2 number of the claims and counterclaims in the action.

3 **IV. CONCLUSION**

4 In its current form, the proposed order of dismissal is factually erroneous because it  
 5 purports to dismiss claims that have already been finally adjudicated. To avoid error and  
 6 ambiguity, the proposed order of dismissal should be corrected as set forth above.<sup>2</sup>

7 Dated: March 5, 2007

Respectfully submitted,

8 ROBERT E. FREITAS  
 9 MICHAEL C. SPILLNER  
 10 ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP

11 /s/ Michael C. Spillner /s/

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 24 <sup>2</sup> As a final note, Micron observes that MOSAID may be attempting to use the erroneous form of  
 25 dismissal to circumvent the Court's order denying MOSAID's motion to vacate Judge Martini's  
 26 prior claim construction and summary judgment rulings. MOSAID may hope to achieve an  
 27 "effective" vacatur by voluntarily dismissing claims that were the subject of Judge Martini's  
 28 rulings, and arguing that voluntarily-dismissed claims are not entitled to collateral estoppel effect.  
 As noted above, MOSAID cannot dismiss claims that were the subject of Judge Martini's rulings,  
 because final judgment has already been entered on those claims. However, avoiding such  
 potential ambiguity and mischief provides another reason to revise the dismissal order in the  
 manner described in the text.